Forms of Social Awareness:
Their Frequency and Correlates

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Two studies examined subjects' estimates of how frequently they experience forms of awareness in dyadic interactions. Awareness forms varied on three dimensions—target (self or other), content (covert experience or overt appearance), and perspective used (that of self or that of other). Subjects indicated that they use the perspective of the other more often than their own only when it provides "privileged" access to the relevant content of awareness—that is, when they think about the thoughts and feelings of the other or about their own appearance or behavior. People high in nurturance or intimacy strivings tend more to adopt the perspective of another to think about the covert experience of that individual, whereas people high in dominance or power strivings tend more to retain their own. Females, relative to males, show a tendency to use privileged awareness forms when thinking about the other.

When do we adopt the perspective of another to think about social behavior, and when do we retain our own perspective? Can personality variables predict differences in perspective use? In this article, we extend prior theory on perspective taking by presenting a taxonomy of social awareness forms. We then present subjects' estimates of how frequently they experience the different forms, and we show how these frequency ratings are related to gender and personality variables.

The ability to take the perspective of another is critical for effective social functioning (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968; Long & Andrews, 1990) and is an important component of the ability to empathize with another (Davis, 1983: Dymond, 1949). Although taking the perspective of another may be helpful in understanding that person, it is important to note that the other's perspective may also be used when the self is the target of evaluation (Figurski, 1987; Piaget, 1926). As Mead (1934) contended, the capacity to assume the viewpoint of other individuals is needed

before one can begin to perceive the self as others do, and the internalization of a "generalized other" enables the consequent development of the self-concept.

The distinction between a perspective that is taken for a social evaluation and the target of that evaluation echoes the suggestion of Wegner and Guiliano (1982) that there are two basic dimensions of social awareness: *tacit awareness* (defined as perspective or vantage point, "where you look from") and *focal awareness* (defined as object or target of evaluation, "what you look at"). Taking one's own perspective, one can be aware of one's self or of the other; taking the other's perspective, one can be similarly aware of either self or other.

Figurski (1987), however, suggests that there may be a third basic dimension. one involving awareness *content*. Specifically, one can be aware of the subjective experience of the target person or of an externalized image of the target. He assumes, however, that the perspective taken on a particular target constrains the content of the resulting awareness. Underlying this assumption is the observation that our own perspective provides unique access to our covert experience—our own thoughts and emotions. This access may be termed *privileged* in the sense that our covert experience cannot be directly known by someone else. Similarly, our own perspective affords privileged access to the overt (observable) appearance or behavior of another, which, without a mirror, cannot be directly viewed by that person. Accordingly, Figurski assumes that we always retain our own psychological perspective when we are aware of our covert experience or the overt appearance of someone

TABLE 1: Eight Forms of Awareness in a Social Dyad

Content	Self as Target		Other as Target	
	Perspective of Self	Perspective of Other	Perspective of Self	Perspective of Other
Experience	(1) Own experience from perspective of self (privileged)	(2) Own experience from perspective of other (nonprivileged)	(3) Other's experience from perspective of self (nonprivileged)	(4) Other's experience from perspective of other (privileged)
Appearance	(5) Own appearance from perspective of self (nonprivileged)	(6) Own appearance from perspective of other (privileged)	(7) Other's appearance from perspective of self (privileged)	(8) Other's appearance from perspective of other (nonprivileged)

else. Conversely, he also assumes that we always adopt the perspective of another person to think about content areas to which that viewpoint gives privileged access—the thoughts and feelings of that person or our own appearance.

In sum, the privileged perspective on covert experience is the *experiencer's* perspective, and the privileged perspective on overt appearance is an external *observer's* perspective. Figurski's exclusion of nonprivileged awareness forms leads to a model of dyadic social awareness consisting of four basic forms—(a) awareness of one's experience from the perspective of the self, (b) awareness of one's image from the perspective of the other, (c) awareness of an image of the other from the perspective of the self, and (d) awareness of the experience of the other from the perspective of the other.

However, some reflection will suggest that people do not always assess an object of awareness from the most direct or privileged vantage point and that the association of a particular perspective with a particular kind of target/content combination is therefore not inherent or automatic. For example, we do not have to take another's psychological perspective in order to evaluate our own appearance. Anorexics cling to an image of themselves as fat, despite the assurances of everyone to the contrary, and seem to assess their appearance largely from their own unassailable vantage point. Second, we do not have to take the other's perspective to be aware of what that person may be experiencing. For instance, we can note another's anguish or embarrassment without necessarily putting ourselves in his or her place; we can retain our own independent evaluative perspective on that experience.[1]

Third, we can remove ourselves from our own experience by viewing it from the psychological perspective of another. Only after adopting the other's perspective, for example, may one realize that one is angry. Finally, we may at times forgo our own privileged perspective on the appearance of another, considering that appearance instead from the perspective of the person herself.

In sum, we suggest that a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ model of dyadic awareness may be necessary to capture the complexity of social experience. In the model, the three dimensions of perspective (that of self or other), target (self or other), and content (overt appearance or covert experience) are crossed to create eight social awareness forms. As indicated in Table 1, four of these forms can be characterized as privileged and four as nonprivileged. The model places traditional concepts of perspective taking in a wider context and may provide a conceptual basis for integrating the many personality constructs that imply that individuals differ in how they experience themselves and others.

Cell 1 (awareness of one's own experience from the self's perspective) can be illustrated by the thought "I am feeling angry," and Cell 2 (awareness of one's own experience from the perspective of another person) is exemplified by "She's reacting as if I'm angry—maybe I am." Cell 3 (awareness of the other's experience from the self's perspective) is illustrated by the thought "She has no right to be so mad," and Cell 4 (awareness of another's experience from that person's perspective) occurs when we think "I'd be furious if I were her, too." Cell 5 (awareness of one's own appearance from the self's perspective) may be occurring when we scrutinize ourselves in the mirror, and Cell 6 (awareness of one's own appearance from another's perspective) may explain our embarrassment if we suddenly notice someone observing us. Cell 7 (awareness of another's appearance from our own perspective) is illustrated by the thought "Why doesn't he comb his hair?" whereas Cell 8 (awareness of another's appearance from that person's perspective) may occur when we notice that a teenager seems obsessed with her complexion.

In our research, we first examined the extent to which people in general believe they use these eight different awareness forms in the context of dyadic social interactions. Consistent with Figurski's assumptions, we predicted that people would report more frequent use of

the four privileged awareness forms than of the corresponding nonprivileged forms, an effect that would be reflected in a significant three-way interaction among perspective, target, and content. We were also interested in studying which specific awareness forms would be used most frequently. Recent studies (e.g., Johnson, Struthers, & Bradlee, 1988; Prentice, 1990) suggest that people tend to think of the self in terms of covert experience (the aspect of the *self* directly accessible from a privileged self perspective) and to think of others more in overt behavioral terms (the aspect of *others* directly accessible from a privileged self perspective). These findings imply that the two most frequently experienced awareness forms may be "self's experience/from the self perspective" and "other's appearance/from the self perspective." Such a pattern of findings would provide evidence that differences in the frequency with which people experience kinds of awareness may directly parallel differences in the way they define themselves and the way they define others.

Our research also investigated whether the reported frequency of awareness forms would vary with gender and with individual differences in motivation. With regard to gender, previous studies have consistently indicated that females empathize with other people more than males do (Davis & Oathout, 1987; Long & Andrews, 1990; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). Females, that is, tend more to adopt the perspective of another person when considering that person's thoughts and feelings (Davis, 1983). We wished to examine whether females also use the perspective of others more when the target of awareness is the overt appearance, as opposed to the covert experience, of the other.

Consistent with control theory proposals concerning the functional relationship between states of awareness and goals, values, and motives (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1982), we also hypothesized that the reported frequency of awareness forms would vary with individual differences in motivation—specifically, motives for interpersonal control and motives for close or caring relationships with others. The dichotomy between the desire to control others and the desire to assist and comfort others appears in one form in the constructs of nurturance and dominance needs (Jackson, 1984). The fact that nurturance entails a sensitivity to the needs of others suggested to us that individuals high in nurturance would be inclined to attempt to understand the viewpoints of other people and consequently would indicate relatively frequent use of others' perspectives. In contrast, persons high in dominance needs presumably have less interest in satisfying the needs of others and might be more inclined to distance themselves from acquaintances. Accordingly, they were expected to indicate less frequent

experience of awareness forms that employ the perspective of others.

In sum, we extend prior theory by proposing that there are eight potential forms of awareness in a social dyad. Study 1 investigated systematic differences in the reported frequency of these forms and also investigated the relation between awareness frequencies and gender, nurturance needs, and dominance needs.

STUDY 1

Method

Overview. Subjects read definitions and examples of the eight awareness forms and then rated how often they used each awareness form in everyday life. They then completed the dominance and nurturance scales of the Personality Research Form (PRF; Jackson, 1984).

Subjects. Subjects were 241 students at the University of California at Davis. They received extra credit in a psychology course for their participation.

Design and procedure. Subjects were told that they would read "descriptions of things that you might think about while you speak with an acquaintance." They were informed that the researchers were interested in both the extent that subjects were "typically aware of these things" and the point of view that they would tend to use when thinking about them (their own or that of the acquaintance). They then read descriptions of each of the eight awareness forms summarized in Table 1. Immediately after reading each description, they rated "how frequently you tend to experience the kind of awareness it describes" on a scale ranging from 1, *never*, to 9, *always*. To illustrate, the description of awareness of one's own appearance from another's perspective (Cell 6) read as follows:

> You pay attention to your own appearance or behavior from the other person's point of view. For example, as you talk to an acquaintance, you are aware of how you appear or sound to that person.

The remaining seven descriptions followed an identical format. As orthogonal variations on the first sentence of the descriptions, "thoughts and feelings" was substituted for "appearance or behavior" as the content of the awareness; "your own point of view" was substituted for "the other person's point of view" as perspective; and "the other person" was substituted for "the self" as target. The concomitant variations in the second sentence of the descriptions were as follows. "For example, as you talk to an acquaintance, you are aware of . . ."

a. your own thoughts and feelings (Cell 1)
b. that person's perceptions of your thoughts and feelings (Cell 2)

TABLE 2: Mean Frequency Ratings of Awareness Forms by Target, Perspective, and Awareness Content, Study 1

	Self as Target		Other as Target	
Content	Perspective of Self	Perspective of Other	Perspective of Self	Perspective of Other
Experience	(1) 7.14 (privileged)	(2) 5.81 (nonprivileged)	(3) 5.49 (nonprivileged)	(4) 5.76 (privileged)
Appearance	(5) 6.09 (nonprivileged)	(6) 6.33 (privileged)	(7) 6.83 (privileged)	(8) 3.73 (nonprivileged)

NOTE: Ratings could range from 1 to 9. Higher numbers indicate greater estimated frequencies.

c. what that person is thinking or feeling, without sharing those thoughts and feelings yourself (Cell 3)
d. what that person is thinking and feeling, and you share those thoughts and feelings yourself (Cell 4)
e. how you appear or sound to yourself (Cell 5)
f. how you appear or sound to that person (Cell 6)
g. how that person appears or sounds to you (Cell 7)
h. how that person appears or sounds to him/herself (Cell 8)

Descriptions of all eight awareness forms were presented to subjects on a single page. Each of the four privileged awareness form descriptions was presented immediately before or immediately after its corresponding nonprivileged form. In addition to this counterbalancing for order of presentation of privileged and nonprivileged awareness forms within pairs, we presented the four pairs in two different orders. Four order conditions resulted. After completing the frequency of awareness ratings, subjects filled out the dominance and nurturance scales of the Personality Research Form (Jackson, 1984).

Results and Discussion

Reported frequency of awareness forms. An initial 2 × 2 × 2 (Target: self/other × Perspective: self/other × Awareness Content: overt appearance/covert experience) within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the frequency ratings of the eight awareness forms. The analysis indicated a main effect for each of these three variables. Subjects reported that they are more often aware of aspects of themselves ($M = 6.1$) than of aspects of the other person in the dyad ($M = 5.2$), $F(1, 240) = 112.61$, $p < .001$; that they generally use their own perspective ($M = 6.2$) more frequently than they adopt the perspective of the other ($M = 5.2$), $F(1, 240) = 109.84$, $p < .001$; and that they are more often aware of covert experience ($M = 5.9$) than of overt appearance ($M = 5.4$), $F(1, 240) = 45.44$, $p < .001$. More important, however, the analysis indicated a significant three-way interaction among these variables, $F(1, 240) = 295.74$, $p < .001$.

As demonstrated by the means in Table 2, the interaction assumed the following pattern: People reported that they use the four awareness forms whose perspectives provide privileged access to the awareness content more frequently than they use the four nonprivileged awareness forms. That is, subjects indicated that they view their own thoughts and feelings more often from their own perspective than from the perspective of the other but that they think about their own appearance or behavior more from the perspective of other people than from their own point of view. A 2 × 2 (Perspective × Awareness Content) ANOVA on the frequency ratings for the four self-as-target cells indicated that this two-way interaction was highly significant, $F(1, 240) = 81.30$, $p < .001$.

When the other person was the target of awareness, in contrast, the reverse interaction pattern was significant, $F(1, 240) = 273.88$, $p < .001$. Subjects reported that they view the appearance or behavior of the other person more frequently from their own perspective than from the perspective of the other. When the content of awareness is the thoughts and feelings of the other, however, subjects reported that they employ the other's perspective more often.

As Table 2 indicates, subjects reported that awareness of their own thoughts and feelings from the self perspective (Cell 1) was the most prevalent form of awareness and that awareness of the appearance of the other from the self perspective (Cell 7) was the second most frequent form. Tukey tests of differences among means indicate that these two privileged/self-perspective awareness forms occur more often (at the .01 level) than the other six forms but do not differ significantly from each other.

Interaction with gender. An additional ANOVA that included gender as a blocking variable revealed a significant Gender × Perspective × Awareness Content × Target interaction, $F(1, 239) = 10.00$, $p < .002$. This effect was clarified by further analyses that indicated that the Gender × Perspective × Awareness Content interaction was significant when the other person in the dyad was the target of awareness, $F(1, 239) = 11.63$, $p < .001$, but not when the self was the target, $F(1, 239) = 1.49$, n.s. The relevant mean ratings for the significant three-way inter-

TABLE 3:   Mean Ratings of Awareness of Other by Gender, Perspective, and Awareness Content, Study 1

| | Males (n = 84) | | Females (n = 157) | |
| | Perspective of Self | Perspective of Other | Perspective of Self | Perspective of Other |
Content				
Experience	5.81	5.75	5.31	5.79
Appearance	6.67	4.15	6.91	3.50

NOTE: Ratings could range from 1 to 9. Higher numbers indicate greater estimated frequencies.

action on ratings when the other is the target of awareness are displayed in Table 3. They indicate that females consider the thoughts and feelings of another more from the privileged perspective of that person than from their own point of view but that males tend to view the thoughts and feelings of another more from their own perspective. Ratings of awareness of the overt appearance of the other person display a different pattern. Although both males and females think about the appearance of another more from the self perspective than from perspective of that person, females show a stronger tendency than males to view the other's appearance from the self perspective.

None of the foregoing effects interacted significantly with the order in which the descriptions of awareness forms were presented to subjects.

Individual differences in social awareness. To assess the influence of personality variables on the estimated frequency of awareness forms, a dominance score and a nurturance score were derived for each subject by summing the appropriate responses on the dominance and nurturance scales of the PRF. Correlations for the 241 subjects were then computed between these scores and the frequency ratings for the eight cells. Dominance was significantly correlated with awareness of the thoughts and feelings of the other from the perspective of the self, $r = .17$, $p < .01$. Nurturance, in contrast, was significantly correlated with awareness of the thoughts and feelings of another person from the perspective of the other, $r = .19$, $p < .01$.[2] Dominance and nurturance were negatively (but not significantly) related, and neither variable was significantly related to any of the remaining awareness cells.

A series of regressions further examined the relation between these two needs and awareness of the covert experience of another. When dominance, nurturance, and gender were the predictor variables in the regression equation and awareness of the covert experience of another *from the self perspective* was the dependent measure, there was a significant positive effect for dominance, $\beta = .15$, $t(237) = 2.35$, $p < .02$, but not for gender or nurturance. When the dependent measure was awareness of the covert experience of another *from the perspec-*

tive of that person, however, there was a significant positive effect for nurturance, $\beta = .20$, $t(237) = 2.99$, $p < .004$, but not for either dominance or gender. That is, people high in dominance tend more to retain their own non-privileged perspective when contemplating the thoughts and feelings of another. In contrast, people high in nurturance tend to employ the other's privileged perspective when they consider that person's thoughts and feelings. Additional regressions indicated that the effects for dominance and nurturance did not interact with each other and that neither variable interacted with gender.

In sum, Study 1 yielded several intriguing findings. The significant three-way interaction among the target, perspective, and content variables showed that Figurski was correct in his untested assumption that privileged awareness forms are prevalent. Our results also suggest, however, that nonprivileged forms are sometimes used. The finding that the two most frequently used awareness forms are those that provide privileged access to self-experience and other-appearance comports with recent research in social cognition. Andersen and Ross (1984), Johnson (1987), Johnson et al. (1988), and Prentice (1990) all suggest that social perceivers tend to define themselves in terms of subjective experience but to define acquaintances more in terms of overt behavior. Our results indicate that the ways perceivers deploy their attentional resources may contribute to this difference. Finally, we demonstrated that our model may also be applicable in studying gender and personality differences.

STUDY 2

There is a strong conceptual parallel between the constructs of dominance needs (Jackson, 1984) and power motivation (McClelland, 1985) in that both imply a controlling orientation toward other people. Similarly, there is a conceptual parallel between the constructs of nurturance needs and intimacy motivation in that both imply a caring orientation toward others. In fact, PRF dominance has been found to be significantly correlated with the number of power-oriented strivings reported by subjects, and PRF nurturance marginally correlated with intimacy-oriented strivings (Emmons & McAdams, 1991).

Of course, there are also differences between the constructs. A nurturant person "gives sympathy and comfort, and assists others wherever possible" (Jackson, 1984, p. 7), whereas intimacy motivation implies a more general desire to experience communion with another (McAdams, 1985). Thus, a volunteer worker in a hospital might be nurturant without necessarily desiring intimacy, or someone might desire emotional intimacy without being very nurturant. Similarly, dominance and power motivation are not identical. A person high in

dominance needs "attempts to influence or direct other people, and expresses opinions forcefully; enjoys the role of leader" (Jackson, 1984, p. 6). In contrast, a person high in power motivation has a more general desire for influence over others (McAdams, 1985), a desire that can take more subtle forms. That is, power-oriented people are not necessarily overtly domineering and do not necessarily assume obvious leadership roles.

Finally, in addition to these conceptual differences between the two sets of constructs, there are differences in the methods by which they are assessed. Specifically, the open-ended "personal strivings" format (Emmons, 1986), which we used to assess power and intimacy motivation, is a more unstructured means of assessing interpersonal orientations than the true-false PRF scales. We note, however, that both the personal strivings format and the PRF, unlike the Thematic Apperception Test, or TAT (which has traditionally been used to assess the social motives), assess conscious motivations. It is the relation between conscious motivations and social awareness that our research investigates.

Despite the conceptual and methodological differences between the personal strivings paradigm and the PRF, we hypothesized that people high in intimacy strivings, like those high in nurturance needs, would demonstrate a tendency to take the perspective of others. Ascertaining and assuaging others' needs is an important goal for individuals high in nurturance needs, and experiencing closeness with others is an important goal for individuals high in intimacy motivation. From a functional perspective, it seems likely that both goals might be best served by adopting the perspectives of others on others' experiences, because these awareness forms should provide information relevant to both goals. In contrast, the goal of controlling others—common to those high in motivation for power and those high in needs for dominance—might be better served by retaining one's own perspective and thus distancing oneself from others' needs. Accordingly, we believed that our results pertaining to nurturance/dominance would replicate with the intimacy/power constructs, supporting the claim that our social awareness model may provide a general framework within which to investigate commonalities between superficially different constructs.

An additional hypothesis was suggested by McAdams's (1985) observation that individuals high in TAT need for power tend to be more concerned with appearances than individuals high in need for intimacy. If so, it seemed likely that individuals high in power strivings might report greater attention to overt appearance or behavior—especially their own appearance and behavior, over which they have direct control. Such findings would provide further evidence that awareness in a social

dyad is predictably related to identifiable personality differences.

A final objective of Study 2 was social cognitive in nature. It was inspired by research indicating that instructions to adopt the viewpoint of a specific other may affect the inferences that we make about that person (Regan & Totten, 1975; Wegner & Finstuen, 1977) and, more specifically, may influence how positively or negatively we view the individual (Gould & Sigall, 1977). In particular, we were interested in the ways in which an experimentally induced manipulation of awareness—that is, instructions to read about a social interaction from the vantage point of one of the eight awareness forms—would influence the favorability of impressions of the participants in the interaction. Specifically, would participants in the interaction be evaluated more favorably when viewed from a privileged perspective?

Method

Overview. Subjects were instructed to read a brief description of a dyadic social interaction from the vantage point of one of the eight forms of social awareness. Subsequently, they completed ratings concerning the participants in the interaction and then estimated the frequency with which they themselves experience each of the eight awareness forms in social situations that occur in everyday life. Finally, subjects generated a list of at least 10 "personal strivings" (Emmons, 1986).

Subjects. Subjects were 321 students at the University of California at Davis. They received extra credit in a psychology course for their participation.

Procedure and dependent measures. Subjects were informed that they would read a scene involving an interaction between a character referred to as "you" and an acquaintance. They were instructed to imagine that they were the "you" in the story, to imagine that they were taking a particular perspective on the scene, and to think carefully about their assigned perspective as they read. For their assigned perspective, they each read a description of one of the eight forms of awareness of Table 1.

Next, subjects read one of two stories. In one story, the conversation between the "you" figure and the acquaintance concerned an upcoming election, and in the other it concerned studying for an exam. Subjects then rated the "you" figure and the acquaintance on measures assessing two generally positive and two generally negative personality traits. For the exam story, the negative traits were "rude" and "uncaring" and the positive traits were "assertive" and "trusting." For the upcoming election story, the negative traits were "manipulative" and "cynical" and the positive traits were "outgoing" and "openminded." All ratings were made on 9-point scales, with endpoints marked *not at all* and *very*.[3] As an additional

between-subjects variable, orthogonal to the awareness form manipulation, subjects rated this set of dependent measures in one of eight order combinations.

After rating the characters in the stories, subjects were told that the next set of questions involved "descriptions of eight perspectives that you might take in social situations that occur in everyday life, including the perspective you just adopted." They then read descriptions of each of the eight awareness forms of Table 1 and rated "how often you personally use each in the course of your everyday life." Each description was rated immediately after reading it on a 9-point scale with endpoints marked *almost never* and *very often*. Subjects read the descriptions in one of two orders.

As a final task, following procedures developed by Emmons (1986), subjects generated lists of at least 10 personal strivings. Personal strivings are conceptualized as the idiographic instantiations of nomothetic motive systems such as power, affiliation, and achievement. They are what people are characteristically trying to do in the course of their everyday lives. Examples of strivings are "trying to make the people around me happy," "trying to seek new and exciting experiences," and "trying to be physically attractive." After completing the task, subjects were debriefed and dismissed from the experiment.

Subjects were randomly assigned to condition.

Results and Discussion

Reported frequency of awareness forms. An initial $2 \times 2 \times 2$ (Target: self/other $\times$ Perspective: self/other $\times$ Awareness Content: overt appearance/covert experience) within-subjects ANOVA assessed whether the "privileged/nonprivileged" difference also occurred in Study 2. The analysis indicated a significant three-way interaction. $F(1, 320) = 160.12$. $p < .001$, with a pattern similar to that identified in Study 1. As in the previous study, separate tests of the Perspective $\times$ Awareness Content interactions on the four self-as-target and other-as-target cells indicated that the awareness forms that provide privileged access to the content of awareness tend to be used more frequently than the nonprivileged perspectives, both when self is target, $F(1, 320) = 40.99$, $p < .001$, and when other is target, $F(1, 320) = 117.59$, $p < .001$.[4] These interactions were significant (at the .001 level) for both orders of presentation of descriptions.[5]

Individual differences in the relative frequency of awareness forms. Using criteria developed by Emmons (1986), two judges coded the strivings generated by subjects as intimacy strivings, power strivings, or neither. Examples of intimacy strivings are "I typically try to do nice things for others" and "I typically try to meet someone to fall in love with." Example of power strivings are "I typically try to make people remember me" and "I typically try to impress people with what I say." Cohen's kappa, a measure

of interrater agreement, was computed to be .95 between the two judges. ANOVAs on each measure indicated that neither number of power strivings nor number of intimacy strivings was affected by the awareness form that subjects were assigned to employ while reading the stories, $F < 1$.

As with dominance scores in Study 1, the number of power strivings given by the 321 subjects was significantly correlated with frequency of awareness of the thoughts and feelings of the other *from the perspective of the self*, $r = .13$, $p < .01$. In contrast, number of intimacy strivings was *negatively* correlated with frequency of awareness of the thoughts and feelings of the other from the perspective of the self, $r = -.11$, $p < .05$, but, like nurturance scores in Study 1, positively correlated with frequency of awareness of the thoughts and feelings of another person *from the perspective of the other*, $r = .14$, $p < .005$. The only remaining significant correlation between either striving measure and an awareness cell was between power strivings and awareness of one's own appearance *from the perspective of the self*, $r = .12$, $p. < .05$.

Following a procedure analogous to that of Study 1, a series of regressions further examined the relation between these two kinds of strivings and the estimated frequency of awareness of the covert experience of another. When power, intimacy, and gender were the predictor variables in the regression equation and awareness of the covert experience of another *from the self perspective* was the dependent measure, there was a significant positive effect for power, $\beta = .11$, $t(317) = 1.92$, $p < .056$, but not for gender or intimacy. When the dependent measure was awareness of the covert experience of another *from the other's perspective*, however, there was a significant positive effect for intimacy, $\beta = .13$, $t(317) = 2.19$, $p < .03$, but not for either power or gender. The effect for power strivings, that is, directly paralleled the effect for dominance score in Study 1, and the effect for intimacy strivings paralleled the effect for nurturance score. Additional regressions indicated that the effects for power strivings and intimacy strivings did not interact with each other and that neither variable interacted with gender.

A final regression investigated the observation of McAdams (1985) that individuals high in power motivation tend to pay attention to their public appearance. Predictor variables in the regression equation were power, intimacy, and gender. The dependent measure, a difference score reflecting the extent to which greater attention is paid to overt appearance, relative to covert experience, was derived by subtracting reported awareness of self-experience from reported awareness of self-appearance. In accordance with our hypothesis, individuals high in power strivings tended to report relatively greater frequency of awareness of their own appearance, $\beta = .15$, $t(317) = 2.54$, $p < .02$.[6] There was no

effect for either intimacy or gender, and additional analyses showed that the effect for power did not interact with either of these variables.

Interaction with gender. ANOVAs including gender as a blocking variable indicated that, as in Study 1, the Gender × Perspective × Awareness Content interaction was significant when the other person in the dyad was the target of awareness, $F(1, 319) = 4.09$, $p < .05$, but not when the self was the target, $F < 1$. The pattern of the three-way interaction for ratings of awareness of the other person was similar to that of Study 1. Females tended to consider the *thoughts and feelings* of the other less from their self perspective, and more from the point of view of that individual, than males did. Females, however, also tended to consider the *appearance or behavior* of the other person more from their self perspective, and less from the point of view of the other person, than males did.

The privileged/nonprivileged effect on the favorability of target figure evaluations. To assess whether the instructions manipulating awareness form affected perceptions of the individuals described in the stories, we performed a $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ (Manipulated Perspective: self/other × Manipulated Awareness Content: overt appearance/covert experience × Story: election/exam × Trait Valence: mean rating on positive traits/mean rating on negative traits) ANOVA on ratings of each of the target figures (the "you" figure and the acquaintance in the story). The dependent measures in each ANOVA were ratings of the target figure on the two measures assessing positive personality traits and the two measures assessing negative personality traits. The ANOVA on "you figure" ratings was performed on subjects who had been instructed to focus their attention on the "you" figure as target, and the ANOVA on "acquaintance figure" ratings was performed on subjects who had been instructed to focus attention on the "acquaintance" figure. Manipulated perspective, manipulated awareness content, and story were all between-subjects variables, and trait valence (mean rating on positive traits/mean rating on negative traits) was a within-subject repeated-measures variable.

The analysis of subjects asked to focus on the "you" figure (i.e., the figure who all subjects were asked to imagine they were) revealed no significant effects involving either of the awareness manipulations. The analysis of subjects asked to focus on the acquaintance figure, however, showed a highly significant Perspective × Awareness Content × Trait Valence effect, $F(1, 155) = 10.53$, $p < .001$. As indicated by the means in Table 4, subjects asked to attend to the *thoughts and feelings* of their imagined conversational partner from the privileged perspective of that individual rated the person more extremely on positive traits, but less extremely on nega-

TABLE 4: Mean Ratings of Other in Story on Positive and Negative Traits by Manipulated Perspective and Manipulated Awareness Content

	Focus on Experience		Focus on Appearance	
Valence	Perspective of Self (Nonprivileged)	Perspective of Other (Privileged)	Perspective of Self (Privileged)	Perspective of Other (Nonprivileged)
Positive traits	4.47	5.24	5.07	4.60
Negative traits	3.95	3.71	3.96	4.45
Difference	0.52	1.53	1.11	0.15

NOTE: Ratings could range from 1 to 9. Higher numbers indicate more extreme trait ratings. Difference scores indicate the extent to which ratings on positive traits exceed ratings on negative traits. Ratings are averaged across story condition.

tive traits, than subjects asked to attend to the thoughts and feelings of the person from the self perspective of the "you" figure. In comparison, subjects asked to attend to the *appearance or behavior* of the acquaintance figure from that person's own perspective rated the person less extremely on positive traits, and more extremely on negative traits, than subjects asked to attend to the appearance or behavior of that person from the privileged self perspective of the "you" figure. That is, instead of revealing a simple positivity bias that arises when the other's perspective is taken on the other, the data indicate that privilege may influence positivity. The acquaintance was rated more positively when the perspective taken on that person provided privileged access to the awareness content, regardless of whether the awareness content was appearance or experience. This pattern did not significantly interact with the story read by subjects or the order in which subjects rated dependent measures.[7]

These findings suggest that to adopt the privileged viewpoint of another on his or her covert experience is to view that person in a relatively charitable light. By attempting to empathize, or to share the feelings of another, we may implicitly validate and endorse those feelings. Awareness of those feelings from one's own nonprivileged vantage point, in contrast, offers more leeway for implicit disapproval, if not condemnation. The person with whom we empathize may be held in relatively high esteem, but the person whose experience we externalize may sometimes be pitied or even scorned.

When attention is focused on the overt appearance of another, however, the privileged/nonprivileged effect on trait evaluations is more counterintuitive. Subjects asked to attend to the appearance of the acquaintance regard the person more positively when viewing that appearance from the privileged perspective of the "you" figure than when they adopt that other's own nonprivileged self perspective to view that person's appearance. We suggest that this effect may be related to a recurrent phenomenon: People who evaluate their own

appearance from their own point of view may frequently be, and be seen by others as, quite critical of themselves. Some anorexics, for example, may both steadfastly cling to their own perspective on their personal appearance, ignoring the divergent viewpoints of others, and be extremely harsh in condemning their own supposedly overweight condition. Others similarly obsessed with details of their own appearance may spend hours at the mirror in fastidious self-scrutiny, scowling with distaste at every slight blemish on their skin. Adoption of the self perspective to evaluate one's own appearance, then, may not generally have benign consequences but instead may raise the possibility of extreme scrutiny, unrealistic standards, and strong condemnation.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The robust nature of our results indicates that people may frequently adopt the psychological perspective of another to process certain kinds of social information—specifically, information that one would have privileged access to, if one really were the other person in the dyad. Consistent with the untested assumptions of Figurski (1987), both studies indicate highly significant effects of privilege on the estimated frequency of awareness forms. That is, whether the target of attention is the self or the other person in the dyad, subjects estimate that they adopt perspectives that provide privileged access to the awareness content more often than awareness forms with nonprivileged perspectives.

Both studies suggest that particular interpersonal goals may create tendencies to experience particular forms of social awareness. This accords with the general principle that goals and motives provide orientation for perceptual systems (Srull & Wyer, 1986). Control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981) offers a dynamic framework for viewing this process, suggesting, in effect, that people monitor situations *from the perspective of their goals.* In so doing, people may detect and correct discrepancies between current situations and desired outcomes and also become aware of new opportunities for goal-related action. Thus, people with particular enduring goals or motives (such as intimacy, nurturance, dominance, or power) may habitually employ particular forms of social awareness, presumably because these forms present information that is useful to those goals.

From this functional perspective, there may be an underlying affinity between dominance and power and between nurturance and intimacy. People high in nurturance needs or intimacy strivings may find that their goals are best served by viewing others' thoughts and feelings as they imagine the other views them. In contrast, people high in dominance needs or power strivings tend to view the subjective experiences of acquaintances

from a more detached perspective. It appears that individuals oriented toward controlling others may attempt to distance themselves from those others by viewing their thoughts and feelings as different—perhaps less "real" or "intense"—from their own, a view that may facilitate their use of manipulative or controlling tactics. People high in power motivation also report relatively greater awareness of their own external appearance from their own perspective (a nonprivileged awareness form). This pattern of results suggests that power-oriented individuals tend to assess the subjective experience of others in terms of their own goals or desires and then tailor their self-presentations accordingly to influence those with whom they interact.

We also propose that tendencies to use specific awareness forms may be related to individual differences in other personality constructs. For example, people who are high in private self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), emotional empathy (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), and self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) may tend to employ Cells 1, 4, and 6, respectively. Narcissistic or anorexic individuals might tend to use Cell 5 (own appearance from the perspective of the self) more frequently than other people do. These speculations remain to be empirically tested.

Subject gender, orthogonal to the effects of these personality variables, was related to ratings of awareness of both the experience and appearance of the other. In both studies, females showed a greater relative tendency to consider the thoughts and feelings of the other person more from the point of view of that person and less from their self perspective—a result consistent with previous research demonstrating the greater empathic tendency of females. Our findings further indicate, however, that the relation between gender and the adoption of another's point of view may be somewhat more complex than previously believed. Females are more likely than males to adopt the self perspective when thinking about the appearance of the other person. Put another way, females, when thinking about another person, show a tendency to adopt the two privileged awareness forms (awareness of the other's covert experience from that person's perspective and awareness of the person's appearance or behavior from their own perspective). These findings suggest that, instead of consistently taking the perspective of others, females may be relatively more inclined to use the perspective that provides privileged access to the desired information. Intriguingly, it is these two privileged awareness forms—the ones more likely to be used by females—that are associated with more positive judgments of the target figures in the stories of Study 2.

One remaining issue concerns the accuracy of self-reports about social awareness tendencies. Accuracy

here depends on our capacity to represent our own thought processes as objects of thought. As in most research on metacognition (Brown, 1987), the issue of how much access we have to these processes is an important one. Ultimately, as with all self-report findings, it would be desirable to validate these results with behavioral data.

Encouragingly, however, our measures varied coherently and predictably with other measures of personality. The PRF scales and the personal strivings paradigm are motivational constructs that have been shown to have considerable external validity (Emmons, 1989; Emmons & King, 1988; Jackson, 1984). In a sense, our findings extend the "nomological net" of these two constructs and simultaneously provide evidence for the construct validity of our own measures. In addition, our data indicate that the most frequent form of *self*-awareness may involve thinking about covert experience whereas the most frequent form of *other*-awareness involves thoughts about the overt appearance of the other. The consistency of these findings with previous research—for example, studies by Johnson (1987; Johnson et al., 1988) and Prentice (1990) demonstrating that people frequently describe themselves in relatively covert terms but describe others in terms of their manifest behavior—provides further evidence for their validity.

We are currently developing a longer multidimensional inventory of individual differences in the use of awareness forms. We will use this inventory to investigate further the relation between awareness form use and other social awareness and individual difference constructs.

NOTES

1. In fact, several writers have distinguished sympathy and empathy on the basis of this detachment of perspective. In empathy, one "abandons one's self-consciousness" in attaining a vicarious experience of the other's state of mind (Katz, 1963, p. 9). In sympathy, by contrast, one retains an independent locus of attention, maintaining a duality between self and other (Goldstein & Michaels, 1985). To preserve their emotional stability and maximize their effectiveness, many counselors (both professional and amateur) may often prefer the nonprivileged, sympathetic perspective to the privileged, empathic one.

2. It is quite likely that the relatively low magnitude of the significant correlations is due to the fact that the frequency of each awareness form was measured by a single item.

3. Additional measures involved subjects' judgments of the extent to which they were "like" the characters in the stories, perceptions of the emotionality of the characters, and causal attributions for behavior. These measures did not display a significant pattern of results and are not discussed further in this article.

4. Although the privileged/nonprivileged effects that occurred in Study 1 were strongly replicated in Study 2, the exact pattern of frequency estimation differences among the eight measures was somewhat different. Specifically, estimates of the frequency with which the perspective of the other was adopted appear inflated relative to the parallel estimates in Study 1 and sometimes exceed estimates of adoption of even the privileged perspective of the self. This inflation is most likely due to the fact that subjects were exposed to the experimental manipulation, read stories from their assigned perspective, and rated the characters in the stories before they estimated how frequently they

themselves experienced the awareness forms. It appears likely that this prior exposure sensitized subjects to the likelihood of adopting the perspective of the other. A subsequent study (Sheldon, 1992), in which 293 subjects estimated their use of the eight awareness forms after completing a 152-item personality questionnaire, in fact replicates the basic pattern of frequency estimate differences identified in Study 1. As in Study 1, the two forms that subjects reported they used most frequently were those involving the privileged perspective of the self—the self's experience from one's own perspective and the other's experience from this same perspective.

5. ANOVAs that included awareness form assigned for the story as a between-subjects variable indicated that the privilege effect on ratings for the four self-as-target cells did not interact with this experimental manipulation, $F < 1$. Although the privilege effect on ratings for the four other-as-target cells was somewhat stronger in certain experimental conditions, $F(7, 313) = 2.87$, $p < .01$, additional analyses showed that the interaction reflecting the privilege effect was significant (at least the .06 level) on ratings for these four cells in each of the eight assigned awareness form conditions, providing strong evidence of its robust nature.

6. Additional regressions showed that this effect for power tended to be significant on both awareness of the self (awareness of self-appearance minus awareness of self-experience) from the perspective of the self, $\beta = .11$, $t(317) = 1.91$, $p < .06$, and awareness of the self from the perspective of the other, $\beta = .11$, $t(317) = 1.84$, $p < .07$.

7. As noted, all subjects rated both the "you" figure and the "acquaintance" figure on all personality trait measures. Not surprisingly, neither ratings of the "you" figure among subjects asked to focus attention on the acquaintance as target nor ratings of the "acquaintance" figure among subjects asked to focus attention on the "you" as target were significantly influenced by interactions with the perspective taken on that particular target or by interactions involving awareness content.

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